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Abstract 
 By studying a two-sector general equilibrium model in which firms engage in 
oligopolistic competition and unemployment is a result of the existence of efficiency wages, we 
derive the following results analytically. A country’s comparative advantage in producing 
manufactured goods increases with the level of efficiencies in the labor market. The opening of 
international trade leads to the equalization of wage rates even though countries differ in their 
factor endowments and labor market efficiencies. If countries have the same level of labor 
market efficiencies but differ in their endowments of labor and land, the opening to international 
trade leads to an increase in the wage rate in both countries. 
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1. Introduction 
For a modern society, oligopoly became an important type of market structure after the 
Second Industrial Revolution (Chandler, 1990). Oligopoly is a prevalent form of market structure 
and industries including automobiles, steel, aluminum, petrochemicals, electrical equipment, and 
computers are all oligopolistic (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005, p. 441). Since firms engaging in 
international trade on average are larger than firms that do not engage in trade, the relevance of 
oligopolistic competition to international trade is greater than that to a closed economy (Bleaney 
and Wakelin, 2002). Firms engaging in international trade frequently have market power and 
engage in oligopolistic competition. 
The impact of opening of international trade on the labor market has been studied 
extensively by scholars (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Brecher, Chen, and Yu, 2013; Caliendo, 
Dvorkin, and Parro, 2015). This paper contributes to the literature by studying how the level of 
unemployment in a country is affected by the opening of international trade in a general 
equilibrium model in which firms in the manufacturing sector engage in oligopolistic 
competition. In this model, the agricultural sector exhibits constant returns to scale. With the 
existence of fixed costs, the manufacturing sector has increasing returns in production. A worker 
chooses to exert effort if the expected payoff from working is not smaller than that from 
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shirking. To provide workers with incentives to exert efforts, in equilibrium there is 
unemployment in the manufacturing sector (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  
Like a Heckscher-Ohlin model, we show that opening to international trade leads to the 
equalization of the wage rate between countries even though countries differ in labor market 
efficiencies. If countries have the same level of labor market efficiencies but differ in their 
endowments of labor and land, then the opening to international trade leads to an increase in the 
wage rate in all countries. In a model without unemployment, the real wage rate increases with 
the opening to international trade if there are increasing returns in production (Venables, 1985; 
Zhou, 2007). In this model, we show that this beneficial effect of international trade remains 
valid with the existence of unemployment. 
In this model, the opening to international trade has an ambiguous effect on a country’s 
unemployment rate. This ambiguity is illustrated in empirical studies. While Autor, Dorn, and 
Hanson (2013, 2016) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) have argued the existence of negative effects of 
trade on employment in the United States,1 Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2011) find positive 
effects of trade on employment in OECD and developing countries. Moreover, Currie and 
Harrison (1997) and Harrison and Hanson (1999) find no significant effects of trade on 
employment in Morocco and Mexico. 
In this model, a higher wage rate decreases a worker’s incentive to shirk. However, 
whether a worker shirks or not is not necessary for the efficiency wage theory to be valid. The 
efficiency wage theory provides other kinds of justification on the positive relationship between 
the wage rate and productivities. For example, a higher wage rate can increase the nutrition level 
of workers and thus increases productivities. While we adopt the efficiency wage approach to 
model unemployment, our results are robust to alternative assumptions. The reasoning is as 
follows. The key equation we derive from the efficiency wage approach is equation (7) below, 
which shows a negative relationship between the real wage and the unemployment rate. This 
negative relationship can remain valid under alternative assumptions of unemployment.  
Unemployment may be the result of various factors, such as labor market search or the 
existence of efficiency wages. First, Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999) study a model in 
which unemployment is of the search type. In their model, firms engage in perfect competition. 
                                               
1 Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro (2015) find that trade reduces employment, but increases social welfare for the 
United States. 
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They show that labor market efficiency is an independent source of a country’s comparative 
advantage. Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2013) 
demonstrate that a decrease in labor market friction in a country may harm its trading partner. 
One significant difference between the above papers and this one is the following. While their 
models incorporate unemployment through labor market search, this model incorporates 
unemployment through the efficiency wage setting. Second, there are models incorporating 
unemployment through efficiency wages or fair wages. Matusz (1996) shows that the opening of 
international trade increases the wage rate. This wage change affects the nonshirking constraint 
in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model and thus the unemployment rate. Hoon (2001) examines a 
Ricardian model in which countries differ in technologies. Brecher and Chen (2010) address how 
international trade, migration, and outsourcing affect unemployment. Davis and Harrigan (2011) 
introduce firm heterogeneity into an efficiency wage model by allowing differences in 
monitoring intensities of firms. Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) explore the impact of 
international trade on unemployment and income inequality in which unemployment results from 
the existence of fair wages. There are some significant differences between those papers and this 
one. In the above papers, firms engage in monopolistic competition. With the opening to 
international trade, adjustment is achieved through the expansion of more efficient firms and the 
exit of less efficient firms. In this paper, firms engage in oligopolistic competition. With the 
opening to international trade, the degree of competition in the market for manufactured goods 
increases. Third, for models of unemployment under oligopoly, Zhou (2015a) examines the 
choice of technology in an efficiency wage setup. However, Zhou (2015a) is a one-sector model 
and does not address a country’s comparative advantage and the impact of international trade on 
unemployment. Zhou (2015b) studies the impact of financial and trade integration among 
developing countries on the level of unemployment. One key difference between Zhou (2015b) 
and this paper is that the wage rate is exogenously given in Zhou (2015b) while it is 
endogenously determined in this paper. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops conditions characterizing the 
equilibrium in a closed economy. Section 3 conducts comparative statics to explore properties of 
the steady state and addresses factors determining a country’s comparative advantage. Section 4 
studies the impact of the opening to international trade on the wage rate and the unemployment 
rate. Section 5 concludes the paper. The Appendix contains proofs of all propositions. 
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2. Equilibrium in a closed economy 
Time is continuous. The endogenous variables are functions of time, but the time notation 
will be suppressed for convenience. Individuals live forever. The size of the population is L  and 
does not change over time. 
There are two types of goods: one agricultural good and a continuum of manufactured 
goods (Neary, 2003, 2016). The production of the agricultural good uses land only.2 The amount 
of land in the economy is T , which is a positive constant. Land is equally owned by all 
individuals.3 The production of the agricultural good exhibits constant returns to scale. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that one unit of land produces one unit of the agricultural good. 
Thus, the level of output in the agricultural sector is T . Manufactured goods are indexed by a 
number ]1,0[ , and all manufactured goods have the same production technologies and enter 
a consumer’s utility function in a symmetric way.4 
 
2.1. Utility maximization 
Individuals are risk neutral. An individual is endowed with one unit of labor. The wage 
rate is w . An individual’s level of consumption of the agricultural good is ac  and that of 
manufactured good   is )(mc . The cost of effort for a worker without shirking is e . The 
subjective discount rate is  . For the constant )1,0( , a consumer’s utility function is 
specified as 
     dtetU t

 )(0 ,    
     esdcctU ma 
  
 11
0
)()( .          (1) 
                                               
2 This specification that the agricultural good is produced by a factor specific to the agricultural sector is similar to 
the setup in Krugman (1991). 
3 With homothetic preferences assumed in this paper, the distribution of ownership of land will not affect aggregate 
demand of the agricultural good and manufactured goods. 
4 One difficulty of incorporating oligopolistic competition into a general equilibrium framework is that a firm may 
have market power not only in the product market, but also market power in the labor market. The purpose of 
having a continuum of manufactured goods rather than one manufactured good is to eliminate a manufacturing 
firm’s market power in the labor market (Neary, 2003, 2016). With a continuum of manufactured goods, since each 
good is produced by a small number of firms, a firm has market power in the product market. Since there is an 
infinite number of firms demanding labor, a firm does not have market power in the labor market. 
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 In the above specification, }1,0{s . If a worker shirks, then 0s ; if a worker does not 
shirk, then 1s . The price of the agricultural good is ap  and that of manufactured good   is 
)(mp . An individual’s expenditure is I , which is spent on the agricultural good and 
manufactured goods: Idcpcp mmaa    )()(
1
0
. 
The unemployment rate is u . If an individual is unemployed, income for this individual 
is z , and 0z . This return can be interpreted as leisure income. Alternatively, it can be 
interpreted as return from being employed in the informal sector in a developing country. For an 
individual, the level of income from ownership of land is  . Thus, the level of income is w  
if employed, and z  if unemployed.  
With the specification of the utility function in (1), utility maximization requires that a 
consumer spends   percent of income on the agricultural good and 1  percent of income on 
manufactured goods. Also, a consumer will consume equal amount of all manufactured goods. 
Thus, the indirect utility function of a consumer can be written as 
   esI
pp
eppIV
ma
ma 

 


 
1
1)1(),,,( . 
If a worker shirks, the probability that shirking is detected is q . The exogenous job 
separation rate is b . The expected lifetime utility of an employed shirker is SEV , and that of an 
unemployed individual is uV . Like Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the asset equation for a shirker is 
))(()( SEu
S
E VVqbwUV   . This equation shows that a shirker enjoys instant utility of 
)( wU , the possibility of job separation at each moment is qb , and a change of asset value 
of SEu VV  . Rearrangement of this equation yields 
     
qb
VqbwUV uSE 



 )()( .           (2) 
 The expected lifetime utility of an employed nonshirker is NEV . For a nonshirker, the 
exogenous job separation rate at each moment is b . The asset equation for a nonshirker is 
)()( NEu
N
E VVbewUV   . Rearrangement of this equation yields 
     
b
bVewUV uNE 



)(
.           (3) 
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 A worker will choose not to shirk if the value from nonshirking is not smaller than that 
from shirking: SE
N
E VV  . From equations (2) and (3), the nonshirking condition is 
     
q
eqbVwU u
)()(   .          (4) 
When an individual is unemployed, this individual still gets income from owning land. 
The instant rate for an unemployed individual to find employment is a . The asset equation for an 
unemployed individual is  
     )()( uEu VVazUV   .           (5) 
 From equations (3) and (5), we get 
    






ba
zUbewUaVu
)()(])([
.          (6) 
Plugging equation (6) into (4), for a worker not to shirk, the wage rate needs to satisfy the 
following condition: 
   
q
eqb
ba
UbewUawU )()()(])([)( 






 . 
In equilibrium, the above relationship will hold with equality. Combining the indirect 
utility function and the above expression, the nonshirking condition becomes 
    




 







u
b
q
eezw
pp ma
)()1( 1
1
.           (7) 
 
2.2. Profit maximization 
Manufactured good   is produced by )(m  identical firms. Firms producing the same 
manufactured good engage in Cournot competition. For a firm, the level of fixed cost is f  units 
of labor and the level of marginal cost is   units of labor. For a firm with output level x , its 
revenue is xp m , and its profit is wxwfxp m  . A firm takes the wage rate as given and 
chooses its output to maximize its profit. Its optimal choice of output yields 
w
x
p
p
xp m
m
m 







1 . From a consumer’s utility maximization, the absolute value of a 
consumer’s elasticity of demand for a manufactured good is one. Combining this result with the 
condition for a firm’s optimal choice of output yields 
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     w
m
pm 




 
11 .            (8) 
 
2.3. Market clearing conditions 
 We now establish market clearing conditions, such as clearance of the labor market, and 
markets for manufactured goods and the agricultural good. 
For the labor market, each individual supplies one unit of labor and total supply of labor 
is L . For manufactured good  , each firm demands xf   units of labor and demand for 
labor from m  firms is )]()()([)(  xfm  . Integrating over all manufactured goods, with 
unemployment rate )(u , the amount of labor is 

 d
u
xfm
)(1
)]()()([)(1
0 

 . Equilibrium 
in the labor market requires  
    Ld
u
xfm



 

)(1
)]()()([)(1
0
.          (9) 
 For the market for manufactured goods, since 1  per cent of total income of this 
economy is spent on manufactured goods and total income is LuzLwLu  )1( , total demand 
for manufactured goods is ])1)[(1( LuzLwLu   . The value of total supply of 
manufactured goods from all firms is  dxmpm )()()(
1
0 . The clearance of the market for 
manufactured goods requires 
   ])1)[(1( LuzLwLu    dxmpm )()()(
1
0 .       (10) 
For the market for the agricultural good, since   per cent of total income of this 
economy is spent on the agricultural good and total income is LuzLwLu  )1( , total demand 
for the agricultural good is ])1[( LuzLwLu   . The value of total supply of the agricultural 
good is Tpa . The clearance of the market for the agricultural good requires 
   ])1[( LuzLwLu   Tpa .         (11) 
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Firms will enter the manufacturing sector until the profit is zero. 5  This condition 
determines the equilibrium number of firms in the manufacturing sector. Zero profit for a firm 
requires 
     0 wxwfxpm  .         (12) 
In equilibrium, the total amount of revenue received by individuals as owners of land L  
should be equal to total land revenue Tpa : 
     TpL a .           (13) 
In a steady state, all manufactured goods have the same levels of output and price. Since 
the total measure of manufactured goods is one and all manufactured goods are symmetric, we 
drop the integration operator for manufactured goods and do not index manufactured goods in a 
steady state. In a steady state, equations (7)-(13) form a system of seven equations defining a set 
of seven variables ap , mp , x , m , w ,  , and u  as functions of exogenous parameters. A 
steady state is a tuple ( ap , mp , x , m , w ,  , u ) satisfying equations (7)-(13).
6 For the rest of 
the paper, a representative manufactured good is used as the numeraire.7 That is,  
1mp .           (14) 
By using equations (9) and (14), equation (7) becomes 
    




 
 




u
b
q
eezw
pa
)()1(
1
.         (15) 
 
3. Comparative statics 
In this section, we study properties of the steady state. To achieve this goal, we simplify 
the system of equations (7)-(13) defining the steady state into a smaller and thus manageable set 
of equations. 
First, equation (8) yields  
                                               
5 For examples of firms engaging in Cournot competition and earning zero profits, see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) 
and Brander (1995). 
6 When equations (7)-(10) and (12)-(13) are satisfied, equation (11) is always satisfied. That is, one equation is 
redundant. With Walras’s law in mind, this redundancy is not surprising. 
7 The choice of the numeraire will not change the equilibrium values of real variables. The reason that manufactured 
goods are chosen as numeraire in this paper is for convenience. With this choice, the wage rate is the ratio of the 
wage rate to the price of manufactured goods. With increasing returns in the manufacturing sector, an increase in the 
wage rate means an increase in the ratio of the wage rate to the price of manufactured goods. If the agricultural good 
was used as the numeraire, the wage rate would be the ratio of the wage rate to the price of the agricultural good, 
and results would be more difficult to interpret. 
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w
m


1
1 .           (16) 
Second, equation (12) yields 
     
w
fwx


1
.           (17) 
With the above manipulation, the system of equations (7)-(13) is reduced to the following 
system of three equations defining three endogenous variables u , ap , and n  as functions of 
exogenous parameters:8 
 
 
ap
zw )()1( 1
1



0




  
u
b
q
e ,        (18a) 
 0
)1)(1( 22



wu
fL

,         (18b)
 
 0)1)(1( 23  fwwTpa  .         (18c)
 Equation (18a) is the condition for a worker to exert effort. This equation is inherited 
from the Shapiro-Stiglitz model. Equation (18b) is the labor market equilibrium condition. 
Equation (18c) comes from the goods market clearing conditions. Partial differentiation of 
equations (18a)-(18c) with respect to u , ap , n , T ,  , b , e , L , and q  yields 
 










































dw
du
dp
wp
wu
wup
a
a
a
33
22
111
0
0 dL
L















0
0
2 dT
T 

















3
0
0
 


d



















0
0
1
db
b

















0
0
1
de
e

















0
0
1
dq
q



















0
0
1
.       (19) 
                                               
8 Equations (18a)-(18c) is derived as follows. First, equation (18a) is derived from equation (15). Second, equation 
(18b) is derived by plugging the value of m  from equation (16) and the value of x  from equation (17) into equation 
(9). Third, dividing equation (10) by equation (11), then plugging the value of m  from equation (16) and the value 
of x  from equation (17) into the resulting equation yields equation (18c). 
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Let   denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix of endogenous variables of the 
system (19). Stability requires 0 .9 
The following proposition studies the impact of an increase in population. 
 
Proposition 1: An increase in population leads to a higher wage rate and a higher price of 
the agricultural good. Also, the number of firms and the size of a firm increase. Impact of 
population growth on unemployment rate is ambiguous. However, if the percentage of income 
spent on the agricultural good is sufficiently low, unemployment rate decreases with population 
size. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. First, an increase in population leads to a 
higher level of demand for manufactured goods. To satisfy this higher level of demand, the 
number of manufacturing firms increases. This leads to a lower level of markup of price over 
marginal cost and each firm produces more to break even. With the existence of fixed costs, 
there are increasing returns in the manufacturing sector. A higher level of output leads to a lower 
average cost. Since firms earn profits of zero, a lower average cost is shown as an increase in the 
real wage rate. Second, an increase in population increases the supply of the manufactured good 
but does not change the supply of the agricultural good, thus the price of the agricultural good 
increases. 
Third, when the size of the population increases, there are two effects on the 
unemployment rate. On the one hand, since there are more firms producing a higher level of 
output, demand for labor also increases and this tends to reduce the unemployment rate. This 
reflects increasing returns in the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, an increase in 
population does not change the level of agricultural output because the agricultural good is 
produced by land. This reflects the “bottleneck” nature of the agricultural sector. Population 
growth causes the price of the agricultural good to increase. When the price of the agricultural 
good increases, other things equal, the benefit of exerting effort decreases. To make sure that the 
non-shirking condition (15) remain valid, unemployment rate tends to increase. In general, 
without imposing additional structure, it is not clear which effect dominates and thus the impact 
of population growth on the unemployment rate is ambiguous. In the special case that the 
                                               
9 Samuelson (1983, chap. 9) provides a justification of this kind of assumption. 
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percentage of income spent on the agricultural good is zero, the second effect disappears and the 
unemployment rate decreases with population. When the percentage of income spent on the 
agricultural good is sufficiently low, the first effect still dominates and unemployment rate 
decreases with population size. When the percentage of income spent on the agricultural good is 
sufficiently high, the second effect may dominate and unemployment rate increases with 
population size. 
The following proposition studies the impact of an increase in land endowment. 
 
 Proposition 2: An increase in land endowment leads to an increase in the wage rate and a 
decrease in the unemployment rate. Also, the number of firms and the size of a firm increase. 
 
 The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. With an increase in the amount of land, 
the value of output in the agricultural sector increases. With a homothetic demand, the ratio 
between the total value of the agricultural good and that of manufactured goods is a constant. 
When the total value of agricultural output increases, the total value of output in the 
manufacturing sector also increases. Since the price of manufactured goods is normalized to one, 
a higher value of manufactured goods indicates a higher level of output. To produce a higher 
level of output, there is a decrease in the unemployment rate in the manufacturing sector. 
 Like the proof of Proposition 2, it can be shown that the impact of an increase in land 
endowment on the price of the agricultural good is ambiguous. The reasoning is as follows. 
While an increase in the amount of land increases the supply of the agricultural good, from 
Proposition 2, the level of output in the manufacturing sector increases and the demand for the 
agricultural good increases. Overall, the impact on the price of the agricultural good is 
ambiguous.  
 An increase in the probability that shirking is detected indicates an increase in the level of 
efficiencies in the labor market. The following proposition studies the impact of a change in 
labor market efficiencies through an increase in q .  
 
 Proposition 3: An increase in the probability that shirking is detected decreases the 
unemployment rate, and increases the price of the agricultural good and the wage rate. 
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The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. When there is an increase in the 
probability that shirking is detected, the punishment for shirking increases.10 The unemployment 
rate declines to decrease the punishment for shirking, so that the condition for workers to exert 
effort continues to hold. A decline in the unemployment rate is associated with an increase in the 
number of employed workers. With increasing returns in the manufacturing sector, the wage rate 
increases. An increase in the number of employed workers is associated with an increase in the 
value of manufactured goods. Since the ratio of the total value of manufactured goods and that of 
the agricultural good is fixed, with a fixed amount of land, the price of the agricultural good 
increases.  
Like the proof of Proposition 3, it can be shown that the impact of a change in the 
exogenous job separation rate b , the cost of exerting effort e , and the discount rate   is the 
opposite of that of a change in q . The intuition behind the impact of an increase in b , e , and   
can also be understood through the non-shirking condition.  
 A country’s comparative advantage in producing manufactured goods is measured by the 
price ratio between manufactured goods and the agricultural good. Since in this model the price 
of manufactured goods is normalized to one, a country’s comparative advantage is measured by 
the price of the agricultural good. The higher the price of the agricultural good, then the higher a 
country’s comparative advantage in producing manufactured goods. From Propositions 1 and 3, 
a country’s comparative advantage in producing manufactured goods increases with the size of 
the population and the probability that shirking is detected. First, with increasing returns in the 
manufacturing sector, it is understandable that an increase in population increases a country’s 
comparative advantage in the producing manufactured goods. Second, suppose the probability 
that shirking is detected increases. From equation (18a), it causes a country’s comparative 
advantage to change shown by an increase in the price of the agricultural good through the 
following mechanism. When the probability that shirking is detected increases, through the 
nonshirking condition, less utility is needed to ensure that a worker exerts effort. This is 
consistent with an increase in the price of the agricultural good: when the price of the agricultural 
                                               
10 In this model, workers employed in the manufacturing sector always choose to exert effort in equilibrium. Also, 
the level of effort of a worker is fixed. Thus, an increase in the probability that shirking is detected does not mean an 
increase in worker productivity or firm productivity. When there is an increase in the probability that shirking is 
detected, a worker’s incentive to exert effort is maintained by an increase in the unemployment rate through the non-
shirking condition, even though the wage rate does not change. 
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good increases, for the same level of income, the utility from working is lower. Thus, an increase 
in the probability that shirking is detected increases a country’s comparative advantage in 
producing manufactured goods. The impact of a change in the exogenous job separation rate, the 
cost of exerting effort, and the discount rate on a country’s comparative advantage can also be 
understood through the nonshirking condition.  
 
4. Impact of international trade 
 In this section, we study impact of the opening to international trade on the wage rate and 
unemployment. Variables associated with the foreign country carry an asterisk mark. The foreign 
country has the same fixed and marginal costs in producing manufactured goods and the same 
technology in producing the agricultural good. However, endowments of labor and land and 
parameters measuring labor market efficiencies in the foreign country may be different from 
those in the home country. Markets for manufactured goods in the two countries are integrated. 
We assume that there is no transportation cost for goods among countries.11 Thus, the opening of 
international trade will lead to equal prices of goods between countries.12 
 With the opening to international trade, equations (9), (12), (13), and (15) remain valid. 
In addition, the following conditions need to hold. First, labor market equilibrium in the foreign 
country requires 
    *
)(*1
)](*)()([)(*1
0
Ld
u
xfm



 
 .        (9*) 
Second, zero profit for a foreign firm requires 
     0****  wxwfxpm  .       (12*) 
Third, in the foreign country, the total amount of revenue received by individuals as 
owners of land *L  should be equal to land revenue *Tpa : 
     ** TpL a .         (13*) 
Fourth, nonshirking condition in the foreign country requires 
                                               
11 Transport costs are important when markets for manufactured goods in different countries are segmented after the 
opening of international trade such as Horstmann and Markusen (1992). In this model, markets in different countries 
are integrated. Like a typical Heckscher-Ohlin model, we assume there is no transport cost. 
12 The result in Proposition 4 depends on the equalization of prices of manufactured goods. With strictly positive 
trade costs, like the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the opening of international trade will reduce the difference of factor 
returns between countries rather than leads to an equalization of factor returns. 
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Fifth, with the opening to international trade, instead of equation (8), a domestic 
manufacturing firm’s optimal choice of output yields 
     w
xmmx
x



**
1 .          (20) 
 Similarly, a foreign manufacturing firm’s optimal choice of output yields 
     *
**
*1 w
xmmx
x


 .       (20*) 
Finally, with a homothetic utility function, the ratio between spending on manufactured 
goods and the agricultural good is  /)1(  . The clearance of the markets for manufactured 
goods and the agricultural good for the world requires 
     
**
*)(
1 xmmx
TTpa




 .          (21) 
 Equations (9), (9*), (12), (12*), (13), (13*), (15), (15*), (20), (20*), and (21) form a 
system of 11 equations defining a system of 11 variables ap , x , *x , m , *m , w , *w ,  , * , 
u , and *u  as functions of exogenous parameters. An equilibrium with international trade is a 
tuple ( ap , x , *x , m , *m , w , *w ,  , * , u , *u ) satisfying this set of equations. 
 With the opening of international trade, the following proposition establishes the 
equalization of the wage rate between the two countries even though countries differ in factor 
endowments and labor market efficiencies. 
 
 Proposition 4: The opening to international trade leads to the equalization of the wage 
rate between the two countries. The two countries will also have equal firm size in the 
manufacturing sector. 
 
The equalization of the wage rate in Proposition 4 is like the equalization of factor returns 
in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. In a Heckscher-Ohlin model, there is a one-to-one 
relationship between relative factor return and relative price of final goods if countries have the 
same production technologies. Thus, equalization of the relative price of final goods from the 
opening to international trade leads to an equalization of relative factor return. In this model, 
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countries also have the same production technologies. To understand Proposition 4, from 
equations (20) and (20*), the wage rate is affected by the level of output of a manufacturing firm 
and the price of manufactured goods. From equations (12) and (12*), the level of output of a 
manufacturing firm is a function of the wage rate. Thus, the wage rate is a function of the price 
of manufactured goods. Since the opening of international trade leads to an equalization of the 
price of manufactured goods in the two countries, the wage rates in the two countries will also 
equal.  
From equations (15) and (15*), though the opening of international trade leads to equal 
wage rate, the unemployment rate in the two countries will be different if they differ in labor 
market efficiencies. The country with a less efficient labor market has a higher unemployment 
rate.  
The impact of the opening to international trade on unemployment rate is ambiguous 
even though countries differ only in labor and land endowments. The reasoning is as follows. In 
a closed economy, the impact of an increase in population on unemployment rate is ambiguous. 
The opening to international trade includes but is not limited to the effect of an increase in 
population. Thus, the opening to international trade has an ambiguous effect on each country’s 
unemployment rate. If countries differ only in labor and land endowments and the percentage of 
income spent on the agricultural good is sufficiently low, the opening to international trade will 
lead to a decrease in the unemployment rate in both countries. 
We now study properties of the equilibrium with international trade. Plugging the value 
of m  from equation (9), the value of *m  from equation (9*), the value of x  from equation (12), 
and the value of *x  from equation (12*) into equation (21) yields 
   
*)(
*)1(**)1(1
TTp
uwLuLw
a 




 .         (22) 
From the system of equations defining the equilibrium with international trade, we can 
derive the following system of two equations defining two variables w  and ap  as functions of 
exogenous parameters:13 
                                               
13 Equations (23a) and (23b) are derived as follows. First, plugging the value of u  from equation (15) and the value 
of *u  from equation (15*) into equation (22) yields equation (23a). Second, plugging the value of m  from equation 
(9), the value of *m  from equation (9*), the value of x  from equation (12), the value of *x  from equation (12*), 
and the value of *)1(**)1( uWLuLw   from equation (22) into equation (20) yields equation (23b). 
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 0*)()1)(1( 22  TTwpfw a  .        (23b) 
The following proposition studies the impact of international trade on the wage rate if 
countries have the same level of labor market efficiencies. 
 
Proposition 5: If countries have the same level of labor market efficiencies but differ in 
their endowments of labor and land, then the opening to international trade leads to an increase 
in the wage rate in both countries. 
 
 The result in Proposition 5 that the real wage rate increases with the opening to 
international trade is like that in Venables (1985) in which firms also engage in Cournot 
competition. In his model, markets for manufactured goods in different countries are segmented 
and there is no unemployment. In this model, we show that this beneficial effect of international 
trade remains valid with the existence of unemployment. With the opening of international trade, 
an increase in the number of firms reduces a firm’s price as a markup over marginal cost. To 
break even, a firm produces more to cover fixed costs of production. With a higher level of 
output, average cost decreases. Since firms earn profits of zero, average cost is equal to price. 
With the price of a manufactured good normalized to one, a reduction in price is shown as an 
increase in the wage rate. Thus, the real wage rate is higher with the opening of international 
trade. 
An inspection of (23a) and (23b) reveals that parameters related to the home country and 
those related to the foreign country affect the wage rate in a similar way. Like the proofs of 
Propositions 1 and 2, it can be shown that the wage rate and the price of the agricultural good 
increase with foreign population and the probability that shirking is detected, and decreases with 
the job separation rate in the foreign country.  
  
5. Conclusion 
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In this paper, we have studied how the opening of international trade affects 
unemployment in a general equilibrium model in which manufacturing firms engage in 
oligopolistic competition. Increases in labor market efficiencies increase a country’s comparative 
advantage in producing manufactured goods. The opening of international trade leads to the 
equalization of wage rates even though countries differ in factor endowments and labor market 
efficiencies. The opening to international trade leads to an increase in the wage rate in both 
countries if countries differ only in their endowments of labor and land. 
There are various generalizations and extensions of the model. First, with the existence of 
unemployment and market power of firms, one interesting extension of the model is to study the 
impact of different government policies on social welfare. Second, while the analysis could 
become much more complicated, it will be interesting to introduce labor as a factor of production 
in the agricultural sector. 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
An application of Cramer’s rule to the system (19) yields 
    0/321 







apLudL
dw , 
    0/321 
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




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dp a , 
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









 /31312
wppwLdL
du
aa
. 
From equation (16), since the wage rate increases, the number of firms increases. From 
equation (17), the size of a firm increases. 
Partial differentiation of equations (18a) and (18c) yields 
        




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 


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 In general, the sign of 
wppw aa 







 3131  is ambiguous. However, if   is sufficiently 
small, 03131 









wppw aa
. In this case, 0
dL
du . In the extreme case that 0 , from 
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equations (18a) and (18b), the following equations are valid in the steady state without 
international trade: 
   zw  0




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u
b
q
e ,         (A1) 
   0
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
.         (A2)
 
Equations (A1) and (A2) form a system of two equations defining w  and u  as functions 
of exogenous parameters. Like the proof of Proposition 1, partial differentiation of the two 
equations and an application of Cramer’s rule yields 0
dL
du . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
An application of Cramer’s rule to the system (19) yields 
0/321 







TupdT
dw
a
, 
   0/321 







TwpdT
du
a
. 
From equation (16), since the wage rate increases, the number of firms increases. From 
equation (17), the size of a firm increases. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  
An application of Cramer’s rule to the system (19) yields 
   0/321 







apwedq
du , 
   0/321 







wuqdq
dp a , 
0/321 







apuqdq
dw . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  
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Plugging the value of x  from (12) and the value of *x  from (12*) into equations (20) 
and (20*) yields 0
**)1(
)1(
2
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w
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 . There are two solutions to this equation. One solution is 
2
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ww , then 1*1 2  ww . Thus, this 
solution leads to a contradiction and is discarded. The other solution *ww   is kept. 
From equations (20) and (20*), if *ww  , then *xx  . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5:  
For a closed economy, the system of equations (18a)-(18c) can be reduced to the 
following system of two equations: 
wLTpa   )1( 0
)(
)()1( 1










q
pe
qzw
wbL
a
,       (A3) 
 0)1)(1( 2  wTpfw a  .          (A4) 
A comparison of equations (23a)-(23b) and equations (A3) and (A4) reveals that the 
opening to international trade can be captured by an increase in labor and land if countries have 
the same level of labor market efficiencies. From Propositions 1 and 2, since either an increase in 
labor or land will increase the wage rate, the opening to international trade leads to an increase in 
the wage rate in both countries. ■ 
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